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COMMENTS
PRESIDENTIAL INACTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
FOR EXECUTIVE NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Daniel Stepanicich∗
INTRODUCTION
The growth of the administrative state and political gridlock in
Congress has made presidential control over national policymaking a
defining feature of contemporary American politics. In contrast to
foreign policy and national defense, where the Constitution clearly
establishes the President as the Commander in Chief, the Constitution only explicitly enumerates a few domestic presidential powers,
1
such as the pardon and appointments. Some scholars argue that the
Framers intended this imbalance in constitutional specificity, as they
meant for the President to possess only weak domestic powers subser2
vient to Congress. Yet, such an interpretation fails to capture the full
powers of the presidency as created by the Framers—not to mention
how the office of the President has developed over subsequent practice. The Framers created a strong executive vested with the power to
3
execute the laws. The President must also ensure that the laws are
4
faithfully executed, creating a duty to oversee executive officials.
These two clauses together, the Vesting Clause and the Take Care
Clause, grant the President significant authority to shape domestic
∗
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J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2011, University of
California, Berkeley. I would particularly like to thank Professor Cary Coglianese for all
of his detailed feedback and support during the writing and research process of this
Comment. Finally, this Comment would not be in its present form without the hard work
of the Volume 18 and 19 editors.
U.S. CONST. art. II.
See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784
(2013) (arguing that the Constitution does not vest the President with broad domestic
powers).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . .
.”); John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45
n.268 (2014) (positing that the Take Care Clause is best interpreted as imposing a duty to
ensure faithful execution among the Executive Branch).
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policy through the enforcement—as well as the selective nonenforcement—of the laws.
The President’s authority in the domestic sphere is unique in that
5
it is largely not an action-oriented power. Scholarship on executive
authority often focuses on presidents and executive branch officials
acting beyond their statutory authority, but presidents can also wield
6
significant authority by under-enforcing a legislative scheme. When
Congress vests executive authority in the President or an executive
branch official, it is left to the executive branch to determine when
and how to execute the law unless Congress has provided guidelines
or has created a mandatory duty. As a result, the President has considerable discretion in executing the law, significantly impacting fed7
eral policymaking.
President Barack Obama has repeatedly used nonenforcement
discretion during his administration, especially after the Democratic
8
Party lost control of the House of Representatives in 2010. This
Comment will look at two such instances—the delay of the employer
mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)
and the immigration enforcement directives announced on November 20, 2014—as vehicles to understand executive nonenforcement
discretion. The ACA requires large employers who do not offer
health coverage to pay a penalty called the Employer Shared Respon9
sibility starting on December 31, 2013. Having previously delayed
enforcement for 2014, the Treasury Department announced in February 2014 that it would phase-in enforcement of the employer man10
date beginning in 2015.
On immigration, President Obama an5

6
7

8

9

10

See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199–200 (2014) (contending that inaction is an important presidential “power” while most of the President’s action-oriented powers are in the areas of foreign policy and national defense).
See id. (arguing that scholarship tends to focus on presidential action while ignoring presidential “inaction” or nonenforcement).
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 115, 121–22 (2013) (explaining how Congress can convey upon the President a limited statutory nonenforcement power).
The use of nonenforcement discretion can be traced back to President George Washington and was frequently used by Presidents George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan. Daniel
T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 807–16
(2010) (reviewing examples of nonenforcement by past presidents).
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2015); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 119, 256 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8,544,
8,577 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, and 301); Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Em-
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nounced in November 2014 that his administration would change its
11
immigration enforcement policies. First, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) would prioritize the removal of certain categories of illegal immigrants over others, focusing on threats to national
12
security and criminals. Second, DHS would extend deferred action
to illegal immigrants who are parents of children legally present in
13
the United States.
Both decisions prompted quick condemnation from Republicans
14
in Congress. The House of Representatives filed suit against the
Obama Administration over the ACA decision alleging that the
Treasury Department unilaterally amended the ACA by delaying the
employer mandate for one year without legislation passed by Con15
gress. Similarly, twenty-six states sued DHS in the Southern District
of Texas alleging that the enforcement policies violated the President’s constitutional duty to enforce the law under the Take Care
16
Clause. On February 16, 2015, the district court judge assigned the
17
The
case enjoined DHS from proceeding with deferred action.

11

12

13
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16
17

ployer Shared Responsibility Under the Affordable Care Act for 2015 (Feb. 10, 2014),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2290.aspx.
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov.
20, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Leon Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of
Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_
action.pdf.
Ashley Parker, Boehner Says Obama’s Immigration Action Damages Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/republicans-immigrationobama.html; Cathy Burke, Republicans Slam Obamacare’s Employer Mandate Delay as ‘Train
Wreck’, NEWSMAX (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-delaysemployer-mandate/2014/02/10/id/551999/.
Complaint at 23–26, United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967
(D.D.C. 2014). Other challenges to the ACA delay have been filed. See, e.g., Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 246, 248 (11th Cir.
2014) (dismissing challenge for lack of standing); Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons,
Inc. v. Koskinen, 768 F.3d 640, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding no standing).
Complaint at 26–27, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. B14-254).
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015). A federal district
judge in Pennsylvania has also addressed the President’s immigration orders finding
them to violate the separation of powers and the Take Care Clause. United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 788 (W.D. Pa. 2014). Unlike Texas v. United States, Juarez-
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Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction on November 9, 2015, and the
18
Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 19, 2016. Meanwhile,
Republicans in Congress attempted to undo President Obama’s immigration enforcement decisions through legislation and appropria19
tion. These twin developments in the courts and Congress will set
the stage for a showdown and public debate over executive power
20
and the extent of presidential nonenforcement discretion.
The debate has already attracted legal scholarship, but so far most
efforts have either been cursory or highly critical of nonenforcement
discretion. Supporters of nonenforcement discretion have either
stopped their analysis at Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court decision that found that there was a presumption of unreviewability for
nonenforcement decisions, or have focused their analysis on the le21
gality of particular nonenforcement decisions. Robert Delahunty
and John Yoo have written the strongest critique of nonenforcement

18

19

20

21

Escobar is not a challenge to the immigration orders, but a finding by a district court judge
that the immigration orders did not apply to the defendant who was an illegal alien arrested and detained by DHS. Id. at 792.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674). Because the Fifth Circuit did not address the constitutional question, the Supreme Court asked the parties to explicitly brief and argue
“[w]hether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.”
United States v. Texas, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674). It was speculated that the late Justice Antonin Scalia inserted this additional question. Julia Preston,
Scalia’s Death Fuels Uncertainty on Immigration Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/scalia-onimmigration/. With his passing, the attorneys for the case and the Justices largely avoided the controversial and difficult Take Care Clause question. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (2016).
See Ashley Parker, House Approves Homeland Security Budget, Without Strings, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/house-homeland-security.html
(reporting the failed attempt by congressional Republicans to gut President Obama’s
immigration decisions via amendments to the DHS appropriations bill).
The judicial route faces numerous obstacles not the least of which is standing. Whether
Congress has standing to challenge a president’s failure to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed is outside the scope of this Comment. For a brief discussion of the
standing issue, see Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Could the House Sue the President for
Refusing to Carry out the Laws?, NATL. CONST. CENTER (June 24, 2014),
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/06/constitution-check-could-the-house-sue-thepresident-for-refusing-to-carry-out-the-laws/ (discussing the issue of standing).
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that that a refusal to enforce is
generally unsuitable for judicial review because of agency discretion); Eric Posner, The
Constitutional Authority for Executive Orders on Immigration is Clear, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/18/constitutional-limits-ofpresidential-action-on-immigration-12/the-constitutional-authority-for-executive-orderson-immigration-is-clear (arguing the President has the discretionary power to allocate resources among immigration enforcement efforts); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 115, 116 (2013) (defending President Obama’s deferred action order for DREAMers).
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discretion following President Obama’s decision in 2012 to apply de22
ferred action to DREAMers. They argue that the Take Care Clause
imposes an absolute duty on the President to enforce all constitu23
tionally valid acts of Congress. The President can only ignore this
duty, they claim, in limited situations where the act of Congress is unconstitutional, equitable considerations are present for individual
24
cases, resources are limited, or where there is de facto delegation.
To Delahunty and Yoo, these exceptions are defenses rather than
sources of nonenforcement discretion, because such discretion can25
not exist given the Take Care Clause.
Zachary Price takes a more flexible approach. He recognizes that
nonenforcement discretion is a valid exercise of executive power but
26
it is limited. A president cannot use policy-based nonenforcement
27
that applies to categories of individuals. Therefore, according to
Price, President Obama’s ACA and immigration decisions are invalid
exercises of executive power because they take a categorical rather
28
than an individual approach to nonenforcement.
Finally, Jeffrey Love and Arpit Garg argue that nonenforcement
creates a separation of powers problem because it allows a president
29
to act unilaterally, contrary to the designs of the Framers. However,
the employer mandate delay is valid under a separation of powers
theory of nonenforcement discretion, they argue, because the delay
served the goals of the enacting Congress by ensuring smooth im30
plementation of the ACA.
These arguments against the Obama Administration’s actions either reject executive nonenforcement discretion or find it extremely
limited. Yet what they lack is any focus on whether the statute in
question imposes mandatory enforcement duties. Law enforcement
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

DREAMers are illegal aliens who entered the United States before the age of sixteen
(usually with their parents), who have not been convicted of a felony, have lived continuously in the United States for five years, and have graduated from high school. Immigration Policy Center, Who and Where the DREAMers Are: A Demographic Profile of Immigrants
Who Might Benefit from the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action Initiative, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/who-and-wheredreamers-are. See generally DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2001) (defining
DREAMers).
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 784.
Id. at 836, 841–42, 845, 851–52.
Id. at 835.
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674
(2014).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 752, 761.
Love & Garg, supra note 5, at 1202.
Id. at 1222.
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is an executive function, and absent a statutory constraint to the contrary, the President possesses wide discretion over enforcement. If a
statute does not include any enforcement guidelines or conditions, as
they often do not, then the President can interpret how and when to
execute the law. Where the statute imposes mandatory enforcement
duties, then the President must carry out the letter of the law unless
the President believes the statute is unconstitutional or Congress
failed to allocate the necessary resources. This theory of executive
nonenforcement discretion best reflects the history and practice of
executive power. Delahunty and Yoo’s denial of nonenforcement
discretion ignores the use of prosecutorial discretion by presidents
31
starting with George Washington. The separation of powers thesis
advocated by Love and Garg does not answer whether nonenforce32
ment discretion is constitutional. Price’s categorical-individual dis33
tinction, while practical, only has limited support in case law. An
analysis focused on the discretionary-mandatory distinction best captures the nature of executive nonenforcement discretion.
This Comment establishes a framework for understanding executive nonenforcement discretion. It does not provide an in-depth and
definitive examination of whether President Obama’s ACA and immigration nonenforcement decisions are constitutional; however, by
creating the proper framework to understand nonenforcement problems based on the discretionary-mandatory distinction, it provides an
initial answer in the affirmative, namely that the Obama Administration’s decisions are constitutional. Part I provides a historical understanding of the Take Care Clause including the pre-ratification context and initial interpretations of the clause during the early years of
the United States. Part II discusses the development of prosecutorial
discretion as a basis for nonenforcement. Part III explains the jump
from prosecutorial discretion to executive nonenforcement in the
administrative law context after Chaney. Part IV examines executive
discretion when a statute creates a mandatory duty. Part V concludes
by briefly applying the developed discretionary-mandatory framework
to the Obama Administration’s decisions regarding the ACA and
immigration.
31

32
33

See JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 72 (2009) (noting that President Washington set the
precedent of under-enforcing the law).
Love & Garg, supra note 5, at 1201.
See generally Letter from 136 Law Professors to President Barack Obama, Executive authority to protect individuals or groups from deportation (Sep. 3, 2014), available at
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf (discussing how prosecutorial discretion fits into the immigration system).

May 2016]

PRESIDENTIAL INACTION

1513

I. UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE POWER:
HISTORY, TEXT, AND THE FRAMERS
The Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution
are the foundations for executive nonenforcement discretion. A
pure textual reading of the clauses might lead to a conclusion that
the Framers created a weak President with no enforcement discre34
tion. Such an interpretation is not consistent with the historical
context of the Constitutional Convention and proclivities of the
Framers who played key roles in crafting the presidency. Popular
consensus holds that the Framers created a weak President in reaction to the abuse of the English Kings and their royal appointees, but
this ignores the post-revolutionary period of weak executive control
35
that informed the views of James Madison. To understand what the
Framers created, one must first look to the British political inheritance and the events contemporaneous to the Constitutional Convention. Viewed through this perspective, the Framers created a
strong executive, which entailed discretion, independent from Congress.
A. British Foundations
The British political and legal system had an immense yet contra36
dictory influence on the Framers. On one hand, abuses committed
by the royally appointed colonial governors and representatives of the
Crown fueled the American Revolution. On the other hand, all of
the Framers, except Alexander Hamilton, were raised to pledge alle37
giance to the King of England. The British system provided the
Framers with one of the few working examples of effective—although
not necessarily desirable—executive power. British monarchial traditions infuse the American presidency as much as the presidency was
designed to avoid the creation of a monarchy.
The royal colonial governors wielded almost unchecked executive
38
power as representatives of the King. As patrons of the King of Eng-

34
35
36
37
38

See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 799 (noting that a dictionary definition of faithful
requires strict enforcement of the laws).
RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 27
(2009).
See generally CLEMENT FATOVIC, OUTSIDE THE LAW: EMERGENCY AND EXECUTIVE POWER
(2009) (discussing British political thought on the Framers and the presidency).
RAY RAPHAEL, MR. PRESIDENT: HOW AND WHY THE FOUNDERS CREATED A CHIEF EXECUTIVE
11 (2012). Hamilton was born in the West Indies to a French Huguenot mother. Id.
See id. at 22 (discussing powers of the colonial governors).
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land, the colonial governors only owed allegiance to the Crown.
40
Early governors ruled with martial law. Later governors still wielded
executive, judicial, and legislative powers in the colonies and could
41
suspend bills passed by the local assemblies at will. All of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention could point to abuses by their
42
former royal governors. The Virginia delegates, several of whom,
such as George Mason and Edmund Randolph, would later dissent
from the final draft for vesting too much executive power, could cite
the governor of Virginia who decreed freedom for any slave who
43
joined the British Army in 1775. The Framers also knew their British history and the reign of King James II. Drawing on the long history of English monarchs suspending acts of Parliament, King James
used his suspending and dispensing powers to exempt officials from
44
restrictions on office-holding by Catholic and Protestant dissenters.
The Glorious Revolution of 1689 ended King James’s rule and the
English Bill of Rights made the royal suspension and dispensing pow45
er illegal. Aware of this history, the Framers ensured that the Presi46
dent would not have unfettered powers that could lead to tyranny.
The Framers who played important roles in drafting the articles
relating to the presidency at the Convention or shaping executive
power after ratification all were predisposed to be sympathetic toward
British conceptions of executive power. Gouverneur Morris was
47
raised in an aristocratic family as his father was Lord of Morrisania.
James Wilson was raised in Scotland and his “aristocratic pretensions”
caused him to waiver in his support for independence in the early
48
years of the Revolution. John Rutledge, who played an important
role on the Committee of Detail supporting a strong executive, studied at Oxford and was admitted to practice before the Inns of Court
49
in London. Alexander Hamilton was a vocal defender of the monarchy having said that “the British government is the best in the
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
The royal suspension and dispensing power allowed the English monarch to ignore acts
of Parliament. Price, supra note 26, at 691.
Id.
See id. at 693 (noting that the Framers rejected a proposal to give the President broad
suspension powers).
Morrisania comprised much of what is now the Bronx in New York City. RAPHAEL, supra
note 37, at 11.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 132.
Id. at 268.
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world, and I doubt much whether anything short of it will do in
50
America.” These men would have all been familiar with William
51
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone was the
most cited author at the Convention after Montesquieu, and his the52
ories were particularly noticeable in Hamilton’s writings. Blackstone
had a very expansive conception of executive power, particularly over
53
the execution of the laws. He believed that executive discretion was
necessary: “For, though the making of laws is entirely the work
of . . . the legislative branch . . . the manner, time, and circumstances
of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the dis54
cretion of the executive magistrate.” According to Clement Fatovic,
the Federalists largely adopted this observation into their belief that it
was occasionally necessary to mitigate the severity of the law in the in55
terests of justice, humanity, or right.
B. Weak Executives under the Articles of Confederation
Given the distrust of executive power during the independence
period, the American revolutionaries turned to legislature-controlled
government. The result, however, was near disaster as government
during the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confedera56
tion was ineffective. This period of weak government was more influential on the Framers who shaped the American presidency than
57
the earlier colonial period of tyrannical governors.
The supporters of a nationalist vision of government and stronger
executive power had first-hand experience with the failings of legislative controlled government. Whereas Patrick Henry and George Mason, each opponents of a stronger national government, came of age
at a time when the biggest threat to liberty was taxes imposed by
overbearing imperial governments and unrestricted exercises of power by royal governors, James Madison came of age as a delegate to the
50

51

52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 168. This position cost him influence at the Convention, and his contributions to
the ideas behind the Constitution are limited. However, he played important roles in the
ratification debates and during Washington’s presidency. Id. at 169.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (noting
nearly as many copies were said to have been sold in the American colonies as in England).
FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 125.
Id.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261.
FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 148.
See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 20 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (detailing the power
vacuum that existed during the period before the Constitutional Convention).
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 27.
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Continental Congress, where he witnessed the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation and tyrannical state legislatures acting against
58
the best interests of the nation. Likewise, Gouverneur Morris was a
delegate to the Continental Congress from 1777–1779 where he witnessed the government’s failures to provide supplies for American
59
troops.
The multiple, ineffective committees of the Continental
Congress frequently frustrated George Washington while he waged
60
war against the British. As a result, these men viewed a strong executive as a means of giving energy to the central government and cor61
recting the problems of the Articles of Confederation.
The lack of any meaningful executive authority was a crucial failing of the Articles of Confederation. The Continental Congress, as
the governing body of the Articles of Confederation, held legislative
and executive power. It executed the laws by appointing “such other
committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the
general affairs of the United States under their [Congress’] direc62
tion.” Eventually these ad-hoc committees became standing committees, but they were often overburdened by their combined legisla63
tive and executive responsibilities. When the Continental Congress
was in recess, the Articles of Confederation created an executive body
composed of one delegate from each state to carry on the business of
64
Congress. However, the committee could only deal in matters that
Congress had specified in advance and could not work on important
65
matters of state. This system, which lacked “energy” (a word frequently used by the Federalists when discussing the need for a strong
66
executive), proved incapable of dealing with the problems facing
67
the American states.

58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 46.
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 39 (2008).
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 56.
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 600 (1994) (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5
(West)).
Id. at 601.
RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 38.
Id.
See FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 176 (noting energy was a frequent theme that pervaded the
Framers’ thoughts on the presidency).
KRAMNICK, supra note 56, at 20. See also BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 15 (finding that the
Articles of Confederation collapsed because state legislatures opposed efforts by the Continental Congress to levy taxes or pay loans).

May 2016]

PRESIDENTIAL INACTION

1517

The states similarly experimented with restricting executive pow68
er. Some states completely abolished the executive, and eight states
69
established executive or privy councils. Except for South Carolina,
the state constitutions eliminated the role of the governor in the leg70
islative process.
The state constitutions created legislaturecontrolled government which quickly proved incapable of executing
the law. Most states were in severe financial crises, so the legislatures
freely printed money, passed debtor relief legislation, set aside con71
tracts, and confiscated property. To Madison, legislatures could be
72
just as tyrannical as a strong executive. The inability of the states to
confront Shays’ Rebellion signaled the death knell of the Articles of
Confederation and pressed Madison, Randolph, Gouverneur Morris,
Wilson, and Hamilton to call for a constitutional convention to empower the national government in stark contrast to the system of
73
weak executive government created a decade earlier.
C. The Constitutional Convention: Drafting Executive Power and the Take
Care Clause
The Framers who would shape the American presidency gathered
in Philadelphia in May 1787 to create a system of government dramatically different from the Articles of Confederation. Madison’s
Virginia Plan calling for a stronger national government would not
have been well received a decade earlier during the revolutionary furor, but the failures of the Articles of Confederation and the states
74
had softened distrust toward executive power. Gouverneur Morris
and James Wilson were the principal authors and thinkers behind Article II, and they were two of the strongest nationalists at the Convention who wanted to correct the failings of the post-independence in75
stitutions.
Therefore, any interpretation of presidential power
should presumably be consistent with their predilection toward a
strong national government.
68
69
70
71
72
73

74
75

RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 39–40.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 56, at 21.
Id. at 25.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 27.
Id. at 18, 21. In 1786, Daniel Shays led an insurgency of indebted farmers against the
Massachusetts government which had adopted a policy of fiscal restraint. Id. at 16–17.
The Continental Congress, which could not raise money to fund federal troops, was powerless to stop the rebellion, forcing the Governor of Massachusetts to raise $20,000 from
private donors to field a militia. Id. at 18.
FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 158.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 56.
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Early in the Convention, the debate was set between a single,
strong, and independent executive versus an executive committee
76
subservient to the legislature. A week into the Convention on June
77
4th, the delegates approved a proposal creating a single executive.
Wilson argued that a council of executives would dilute authority and
deprive the national government of “energy, dispatch, and responsi78
bility.” While dissenters would continue to push for an executive
council throughout the Convention, the issue was settled for most
delegates in favor of Wilson’s position of vesting executive authority
79
in one individual. Two months later, after little progress, the delegates submitted a resolution on the executive to the Committee of
Detail:
That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be
chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on
impeachment, and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to publick [sic]
80
service; to be paid out of the publick [sic] treasury.

The Committee of Detail would dramatically rework what would be81
come Article II including the Vesting and Take Care Clauses.
The Committee of Detail removed the executive’s “power to carry
into execution the national laws” and replaced it with the Vesting
Clause (“the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
82
United States of America”) and the Take Care Clause (“he shall take
83
Care that the laws be faithfully executed”). Lawrence Lessig and
Cass Sunstein argued that this change was meant to weaken the presidency vis-à-vis Congress, removing any discretionary implied power
76
77
78
79
80

81

82
83

RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 54.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 134.
Id. at 127.
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, at 34 (noting that Mason tried to reintroduce an executive council during the last week of the convention).
JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Gaillard Hund & James Brown Scott
eds., 1920), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp (emphasis added).
The Committee of Detail consisted of Wilson, Rutledge, Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, and
Nathaniel Gorham. Id. Rutledge was good friends with Wilson and a strong advocate of
executive power, having been governor of South Carolina where he was called “the Dictator.” BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 267, 269. Gorham and Ellsworth did not play significant
roles on the committee. See id. at 265 (discussing roles on the committee). Randolph entered the Convention as a vocal supporter of a strong national government, but his support faltered as more power was given to the President. Id. at 266.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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regarding how to carry into execution the laws. This interpretation
fails to take into account the Framers’ desire for a strong executive
and makes the assumption that Wilson would have allowed the
Committee of Detail to weaken the presidency by removing enforcement discretion. Both clauses were additionally modified by the
Committee of Style where Gouverneur Morris furthered the national85
ist agenda producing the current versions.
The Framers intended the Vesting Clause to grant executive pow86
er to the President. Hamilton viewed the clause as a general grant
of power rather than merely identifying the recipient of the powers
87
enumerated in Article II. Likewise, Madison believed that Article II
88
vested all executive power in the President. Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes argue that comparisons of the vesting clauses of Articles I,
II, and III support Hamilton and Madison’s interpretations. The
Vesting Clause of Article III must be read as a grant of power; otherwise, there would be no constitutional source of the judiciary’s au89
thority to act. Meanwhile, the Vesting Clause of Article II is linguistically similar to Article III; therefore, the Vesting Clause of Article II
90
must be read as a grant of power. Originally, the vesting clauses in
each Article were identical but Gouverneur Morris altered the language found in Article I to the current language so as to limit Con91
gress’s powers to the enumerated powers. Unitary Executive theorists such as Calabresi and Prakash require an interpretation that all
executive power is vested in the President. For the purposes of this
Comment, it is enough to reach only so far as to read the Vesting
Clause as a grant of executive power.
84
85

86

87
88
89
90
91

Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 66 (1994).
See RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 120 (finding that some scholars have argued that Gouverneur Morris exceeded the grant of authority given to the Committee of Style by making
significant changes to strengthen the President and the national government). Hamilton
and Madison also were appointed to the Committee of Style, although most of the writing
was delegated to Morris. BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 346.
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 995 (1993). Since the Take Care Clause conditions the powers granted by the Vesting Clause, it is necessary to briefly examine the operation of the Vesting Clause to understand the Take Care Clause.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1992).
Id. at 1178.
Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, supra note 86, at 996–97. Gouverneur Morris’s
preference for executive power elicited the observation from Madison that Morris was
never “inclined to the democratic side.” BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 346.
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If the Vesting Clause is interpreted as a grant of executive power,
92
then the Take Care Clause is best interpreted as a duty. Unfortunately, there is little recorded debate during the Convention sur93
rounding the Take Care Clause. It appears that the clause may have
been included to forbid the President from wielding a suspension
94
power akin to the royal prerogatives of King James II. The Framers,
however, did not understand the Take Care Clause as a presidential
straitjacket. During the debates on selection of the President, Wilson
stressed the importance of keeping the President independent from
the legislature otherwise the executive would become a “mere crea95
ture” of the legislature. If the Framers intended to give the President no discretion in executing the law, then they would have presumably adopted the plan originally proposed to the Committee of
96
Detail to allow Congress to select the President.
The President
needed to be able to wield discretion in order to be an effective executive and able to check the legislature. It is hard to fathom that
two of the strongest supporters of executive power, Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, would have removed executive discretion from their
97
drafts for the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style.
The Committee of Style made one important change to the Take
Care Clause. The Committee of Detail’s version read, “he shall take
care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully execut98
ed. . . .”. The Committee of Style removed the word “duly” in its re99
ported version that became the final text. Unfortunately, there is no
100
recorded account of why the Committee made the change.
John-

92
93

94
95

96
97

98
99
100

See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 583 (arguing that the Take Care Clause is a duty
to faithfully carry out the grant of power in the Vesting Clause).
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 84, at 64. Richard Beeman’s exhaustive historical study of
the Constitutional Convention does not include any mention of the Take Care Clause.
See generally BEEMAN, supra note 35 (failing to discuss the Take Care Clause).
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 583–84; Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking
and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613 (1989).
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 231. See also Prakash, supra note 75, at 1001 (finding that Wilson did not believe faithful execution of the laws turned the President into a functionary
of Congress).
See RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 90 (suggesting that allowing Congress to select the President would have resulted in congressional insiders dominating the presidency).
Lessig and Sunstein suggest that the draft submitted to the Committee of Detail (“power
to carry into execution the natl. laws”) allowed for executive discretion, but the final draft
of the Committee of Detail (the Take Care Clause) removed that discretion. Lessig and
Sunstein, supra note 84, at 66; JAMES MADISON, supra note 80.
JAMES MADISON, supra note 80 (emphasis added).
Id.
Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 213, 227 (2015).
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son’s Dictionary defines “duly” as “properly; fitly; in the due manner.”
102
By reThis suggests a mechanical obligation to carry out the law.
moving “duly” and focusing on “faithfully” executing the laws, the
103
Committee gave discretion to the President.
Eighteenth century
usage of the word “faithfully” suggests an agency relationship with
104
implied discretion rather than a requirement of strict adherence.
The evolution of the Take Care Clause at the Constitutional Convention shows that the Framers purposefully gave the President discretion in enforcing the law.
The Take Care Clause is a presidential duty to oversee and control
105
the faithful execution of the laws. The President cannot suspend a
valid mandatory or ministerial duty imposed by Congress, but execution of the law implies discretion to choose the manner, time, and
circumstances of that execution as understood by Blackstone and his
contemporaries among the Framers.
D. Interpreting the Confusion Created by the Constitutional Convention
The document created by the Constitutional Convention was far
from clear about presidential powers, something which caused much
difficulty for the delegates throughout the Convention. While the
delegates were able to reach agreement on matters such as how to select the President, the veto, and treaty-making, the delegates never
106
explicitly defined executive power. It would be left to others, such
as Hamilton and the Supreme Court, to determine the extent of ex107
ecutive power.
Hamilton was quick to defend executive power during the ratification debates and as Treasury Secretary to President Washington. In
Federalist No. 70, Hamilton made the case for a single executive as opposed to vesting executive power in multiple people or vesting power
108
in a single individual but subjecting him to a council.
Hamilton
feared that vesting executive power into a plural executive would un101
102
103
104

105
106
107
108

SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
Blackman, supra note 100, at 228.
Id. at 232.
Price, supra note 26, at 698 (“[T]he Constitution suggests that proper performance of the
executive function may require adherence to notions of justice, equity, and the public interest, even at the expense of complete enforcement of each and every statutory mandate.”).
Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, supra note 86, at 1001.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 349.
Washington’s presidency played a key role in defining executive power, but his views of
executive power will be explored in Part II.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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dermine accountability and lead to a lack of vigor in government,
109
which was a hallmark of the Articles of Confederation. In Federalist
No. 72, Hamilton explicitly stated that the administration of govern110
ment falls within the executive department. The administration of
government included tasks such as foreign affairs, finance, the application and disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress, and the
111
direction of war operations.
Crucially, the persons “to whose immediate management these different matters are committed ought to
be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate,
and on this account they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to
112
his superintendence.” The Constitution vested executive power in
a single individual who had the authority, with implied discretion, to
oversee all other executive officers. A few years later, Hamilton even
more strongly explained executive power in his defense of President
Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality designed to keep the Unit113
ed States out of war between Britain and France. Writing under the
pseudonym Pacificus, Hamilton argued that the Vesting Clause in Ar114
ticle II was a general grant of power that belonged to the President.
Hamilton’s writings provide some clarity to the Vesting Clause and
executive power, but he never directly addressed the Take Care
Clause.
The Take Care Clause has rarely been litigated, but two early Supreme Court decisions—Marbury v. Madison and Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes—provide the best post-ratification understanding of
the clause. Marbury is best remembered for judicial review, but the
case provided the first judicial interpretation of the Take Care
115
Clause.
President Thomas Jefferson instructed Secretary of State
Madison to withhold William Marbury’s commission as Justice of the
116
Marbury challenged that Madison violated an act of ConPeace.
117
gress by failing to deliver the commission. Chief Justice John Mar109
110
111
112
113
114

115
116
117

Id. at 406.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Id.
Id. at 413.
FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 200–01.
Id. at 201–02. Madison wrote in opposition to Hamilton under the pseudonym, Helvidius, and argued for a reduced scope of executive power which was inconsistent with his
views during the Convention that the executive must not be subservient to the legislature.
Id. at 202–03.
TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE
DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 5 (2014).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803).
Id. at 155–56.
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shall observed that “whether the legality of an act of the head of a
department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always
118
depend on the nature of the act.” There are two types of acts. The
first type is a political action which remains in the discretion of the
President alone, and there cannot be any power to control that discretion:
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only po119
litically examinable.

The second type of action is a specific duty assigned by law:
[W]hen [the President] is directed peremptorily [by the legislature] to
perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law, is amendable
to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the
120
vested rights of others.

Marshall created a distinction between discretionary duties (either
statutory or constitutional) affecting the nation, versus mandatory or
121
ministerial duties affecting individuals. Only the latter is enforcea122
ble in the courts.
123
The Supreme Court revisited the Take Care Clause in Kendall.
The case was brought by a group of mail carrier contractors against
the Postmaster General for failing to comply with a federal law that
124
directed the Postmaster General to provide for back pay.
Supposedly, the President directed the Postmaster to refuse to pay the
125
Justice Thompson again obamount owed to the mail carriers.
served the distinction between discretionary acts, which are left to the
President, and ministerial acts, which are beyond the control of the
President:
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the
President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that Congress cannot
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think prop118

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. at 165. Since the Court found no jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion remains dicta. Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003).
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610–13 (1838).
Id. at 608.
GARVEY, supra note 115, at 5.
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er . . . this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial
126
character.

The Postmaster General was vested with no discretionary authority to
127
The Court further held
ignore a ministerial duty required by law.
128
that the Take Care Clause was not a dispensing power. Kendall held
that the Take Care Clause did not grant a broad suspension power
akin to the former powers of the King of England, but it recognized
129
broad executive discretion for non-ministerial acts.
Marbury and
Kendall stand for the proposition that the Take Care Clause requires
that the President cannot ignore ministerial duties imposed by Congress, while discretionary duties remain under the control of the President.
E. Summarizing the Historical Foundation
The Framers intended to create a strong executive after witnessing the repeated failures of the Articles of Confederation and the
states to wield effective executive power. Wilson and Gouverneur
Morris, the two principal drafters of Article II, were among the
strongest supporters of a strong national government. They created a
single president vested with a broad grant of executive power qualified by a duty to faithfully execute the law. As understood by the
Framers and later interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Take Care
Clause prohibited a President from ignoring acts of the legislature
130
akin to the royal prerogatives held by the English monarchy. However, the Framers also understood that executing the law implied discretion, otherwise there would have been no need to ensure the independence of the executive from the legislature. As long as a
congressional act grants discretionary authority, rather than creating
a ministerial duty or cabining the President’s discretion through
guidelines as will be explored in Part III, the President can execute
the law as he sees fit.

126
127
128

129
130

Kendall, 37 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
Id. at 613.
See id. (“To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”).
Id. at 610–13.
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 807–08 (linking the Take Care Clause to the English
Bill of Rights). In their opposition to prosecutorial discretion, Delahunty and Yoo assume that there is law to suspend and dispense; however, enforcement actions are unique
because they are usually committed to agency discretion by law. Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985). See discussion infra Part III.B.
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II. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
By virtue of the Vesting Clause in Article II, the President is granted the power to execute the law, which means law enforcement.
Johnson’s Dictionary, published contemporaneously with the Revolutionary period, defined “executive” as “having the power to put in act
131
the laws.” Likewise, the Framers understood executive power to in132
clude law enforcement.
This may require the President to use his
133
executive authority to initiate, stop, or restrain execution of a law.
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion did not fully emerge until
after advancements in communication and the expansion of the federal government following the Civil War, but presidents since the
founding wielded prosecutorial discretion.
A. The Founding Generation’s Approach to Prosecutorial Discretion
Presidents starting with George Washington believed that they
have the discretion to enforce the law. Critics of prosecutorial discretion point out that executive oversight of law enforcement has origins
134
that are more recent. Harold Krent has argued that executive control over law enforcement did not exist at the founding, since Congress did not provide the Attorney General with any mechanism to
135
oversee federal district attorneys in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Executive branch officials repeatedly asked for oversight authority, but
136
Congress denied authority until the Civil War.
This account ignores the fact that early presidents since Washington and Jefferson
believed that they had a constitutional rather than a statutory authority
137
to direct federal district attorneys. President Washington occasionally issued instructions directly to the district attorneys with a citation
138
to the Take Care Clause or the Vesting Clause. During the Whiskey
Rebellion, President Washington directed his Attorney General to
131
132

133
134
135
136
137
138

SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010)
(quoting Madison, “if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws”); Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1735 (2005) (noting that Wilson
believed that the ability to execute the law and control its execution by officers was the
defining trait of a chief executive).
Prakash, supra note 132, at 546.
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History,
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 287–89.
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 553.
Id.
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139

supervise the indictment of individuals involved in the uprising.
However, he also instructed the district attorney to end prosecutions
140
President
against two individuals who he believed were innocent.
Washington ordered prosecutors to ignore noncitizen violators of the
141
Neutrality Act of 1794 based on considerations of justice and equity.
All of these instances of prosecutorial discretion elicited no backlash
from Congress or the judiciary, which Prakash cites as evidence that
the other branches found nothing wrong with President Washing142
ton’s exercise of enforcement discretion.
Similarly, President Jefferson believed that he had enforcement
143
discretion authority granted from the Constitution. He strongly believed that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, and he
144
directed the district attorneys to halt ongoing prosecutions.
President Jefferson justified his enforcement discretion:
The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an offence
then to be prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is
not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued and put into legal
train . . . . There appears to . . . be no weak part in any of these positions
145
or inferences.

President Jefferson understood that the President could readily intervene and direct enforcement actions to ensure faithful execution of
146
the laws including the Constitution.
Both Presidents Washington
and Jefferson did not believe that the absence of statutory authority

139
140
141
142
143

144

145

146

CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, at 48.
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 554.
Price, supra note 26, at 728.
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 558.
President Jefferson usually premised his ability to use prosecutorial discretion on a theory
of the presidential prerogative or duty to decline enforcement of laws that the President
believes to be unconstitutional, rather than on a theory of general enforcement discretion. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 813. However, President Jefferson expanded his
use of prosecutorial discretion beyond constitutionalism concerns in the later years of his
presidency, especially when enforcing the Embargo Act. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60,
at 72–73.
Although the Sedition Act expired before Jefferson entered office, the expiration did not
terminate any ongoing prosecutions. Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 560–
61.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Vice President of the U.S., to Edward Livingston, U.S. Attorney
for
the
Dist.
of
N.Y.
(Nov.
1,
1801),
available
at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-35-02-0451.
See id. (showing that President Jefferson believed the Executive could control prosecutions, but did not identify whether his enforcement discretion specifically came from the
Vesting Clause or the Take Care Clause).
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to direct or suspend law enforcement was problematic because they
147
believed such authority was granted by the Constitution.
B. The Modern Conception of Prosecutorial Discretion
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion underwent a change during the nineteenth century as the federal government expanded.
During the early nineteenth century, the federal district attorneys
operated independently of Washington, D.C., except when the Presi148
This
dent or his Attorney General felt the need to intervene.
framework made sense in an era when it was difficult to communicate
149
detailed instructions in a timely manner.
Moreover, the Attorney
General did not have an office in Washington, D.C. and only had one
clerk until 1850, making oversight of all federal enforcement imprac150
tical.
The Attorney General was finally given supervisory authority
over the federal district attorneys in 1861, and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was established in 1870 incorporating the district attor151
neys (now called United States Attorneys). Over the next century,
152
federal prosecution was slowly centralized in DOJ headquarters.
Meanwhile, the federal criminal code rapidly expanded, resulting in
a mismatch between the broad scope of federal law and the relatively
153
small number of resources to enforce those laws.
In 1873, there
were 183 separate offenses; that number exceeded 1000 offenses by
154
2009. Since the DOJ can only prosecute a small fraction of the cas155
es, prosecutorial discretion is frequently used to manage caseloads.
Reflecting these changes, the federal courts cemented the executive branch’s use of prosecutorial discretion and immunized it from
judicial review. Courts have based prosecutorial discretion on a separation of powers argument recognizing that the Executive has wide

147

148
149
150
151
152

153
154
155

See Price, supra note 26, at 676 (suggesting that executive officials from the beginning
recognized that discretionary authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes was derived from their executive role).
Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 369, 392–93 (2009).
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 564.
Beale, supra note 148, at 394.
Id. at 395.
The period also saw the U.S. Attorneys lose their own prosecutorial discretion to DOJ
executive officers in Washington, making it easier for the President and the Attorney
General to control federal law enforcement. Id. at 398.
Id. at 400.
Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development,
6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
See Beale, supra note 148, at 400–01 (noting the use of discretion by prosecutors).
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discretion, notwithstanding the duty of the Take Care Clause. United States v. Cox, a Fifth Circuit case, is the most often cited case for this
157
proposition. The court held that a district court could not force a
158
United States Attorney to sign an indictment.
In its discussion of
prosecutorial discretion the court observed that “[t]he Attorney General is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses,
159
be faithfully executed.” Since the Attorney General is an officer of
the executive department, he exercises discretion as to whether the
160
case should be prosecuted.
Furthermore, “as an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers . . . the courts are not to interfere
with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of
161
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.” Cox
establishes that prosecutorial discretion is an executive function derived from the Take Care Clause’s faithful execution language, and
courts cannot review a prosecutorial decision without violating separation of powers.
The Supreme Court took a similar approach, immunizing prose162
cutorial discretion from judicial review. In United States v. Nixon, the
Supreme Court bluntly stated that “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute
163
a case.” While the Court did not provide any more detail behind its
statement, the Court elaborated later in United States v. Armstrong.
The Attorney General has “broad discretion” to enforce federal criminal laws because he is designated by statute as the President’s dele-

156

157
158
159
160

161
162

163

See Krauss, supra note 154, at 10–11 (noting that the Take Care Clause is the most widely
cited constitutional text to support the doctrine that prosecutorial discretion is inherently
an executive function immune from judicial review given the separation of powers doctrine).
Id.
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 171.
Id. Two years later, the Fifth Circuit held that prosecutorial discretion is always required,
especially “when the interests of the nation require that a prosecution be foregone.”
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Cox, 342 F.2d at 182
(Brown, J., concurring)).
Cox, 342 F.2d at 171.
A century before Cox, the Supreme Court recognized that the district attorney, as an executive officer, has absolute discretionary control over the prosecution and may dismiss
the case without review by the court. The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457
(1868).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Cox, 342 F.2d at 171; The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 457).
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gate to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The decision
to prosecute is left to the Attorney General’s discretion and not subject to judicial review because it is within the “special province” of the
165
Executive. By the 1980s and 1990s, prosecutorial discretion within
the criminal law context was widely accepted by the courts as a valid
exercise of executive power under the Take Care Clause.
C. Summarizing the Development of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion has its roots in the founding. Presidents
Washington and Jefferson repeatedly intervened in prosecutions out
of concern for equity or even policy preference. They believed that
their authority to direct prosecutions came from the Constitution.
This view was adopted by the courts developing the modern doctrine
of prosecutorial discretion where the Executive has near complete
discretion to determine when and how to prosecute violations of federal law. Just as the doctrine developed in response to the growth of
federal criminal statutes after the Civil War, it was only a matter of
time before prosecutorial discretion became a frequent tool of executive branch officials in reaction to the expansion of the administrative
state after the New Deal.
III. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
While prosecutorial discretion in the criminal law context is long
recognized, prosecutorial discretion or enforcement discretion in the
civil context is a more recent, but still well established, development.
Enforcement discretion was not particularly necessary in the civil
context until the rapid growth of the federal government and admin166
istrative agencies during the twentieth century. With the adoption
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in 1946, enforcement
164

165

166

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); see also Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (stating that the government has broad discretion over whom to
prosecute); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S., 368, 380, n.11 (1982) (noting that selective enforcement is not a constitutional violation as long as it is not based on race, religion, or some other arbitrary classification).
Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). However, the immunity is
qualified subject to certain restraints such as due process and equal protection. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (holding that the government has
absolute discretion to prosecute “so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants”). Other constraints will be discussed in Part III.
There is some historical precedent for the use of prosecutorial discretion in the civil context. See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 454 (involving the use of prosecutorial
discretion regarding the condemnation of property used against the United States during
the Civil War).
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discretion was implicitly endorsed, as Section 701(a)(2) denied judicial review for agency actions “committed to agency discretion by
167
With more government programs than resources available,
law.”
under-enforcement (including nonenforcement) became a tool in
168
the arsenal of presidents set on deregulation. Heckler v. Chaney, decided in 1985, is the seminal case linking executive enforcement discretion in the criminal context to the civil context and creating a presumption of no judicial review for agency nonenforcement decisions
unless Congress has cabined the agency’s discretion through statuto169
ry guidelines or mandatory language.
A. The Run-Up to Chaney
The D.C. Circuit addressed the connection between prosecutorial
discretion and civil enforcement in isolated cases such as Adams v.
Richardson. That case involved a challenge against the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) for failing to take enforcement actions to end segregation in public schools receiving federal
170
funds. HEW attempted to liken its enforcement policy to the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General, but the court found the
specific facts of the case distinguishable from prosecutorial discretion
171
in the criminal law context.
The court found that Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 established “specific enforcement procedures,” making Section 701(a)(2) of the APA inapplicable since there

167

168

169

170
171

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
interpreted this to mean instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply.” 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79752, at 212 (1945)).
President Ronald Reagan refused to enforce civil rights laws, President George H.W.
Bush delayed implementation of environmental statutes, and President George W. Bush
relaxed environmental rules. Cheh, supra note 118at 266.
See Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President
Obama’s Immigration Action, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 673 (2016) (noting that Chaney is the
leading case on prosecutorial discretion within the administrative law context); Peter
Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1239 (2010) (recognizing that Chaney linked prosecutorial discretion in criminal law to administrative law); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same
Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 485
(2008) (noting the volume of citations to Heckler v. Chaney); Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN
L. REV. 131, 134 (1992) (arguing that Chaney represented a turning point in the recognition of prosecutorial discretion in the administrative law context).
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1162.
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172

was law to apply. More importantly, the court found that the facts
of the case did not make it a pure enforcement discretion case since
HEW was affirmatively providing funds to civil rights violators (contrary to the statute) rather than merely declining to prosecute civil
173
rights abusers.
Adams acknowledged the similarity between criminal prosecutorial discretion and civil enforcement discretion, but the
court declined to find that HEW had enforcement discretion because
174
the statute was clear in mandating the means of enforcement.
B. The Heckler v. Chaney Decision
After Adams, Chaney significantly altered the scope of judicial review over nonenforcement decisions and expanded the underlying
support for nonenforcement discretion in the civil context. Inmates
on death row sued the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
take enforcement action to prevent certain legal injection drugs to be
175
used in executions. The petitioners argued that the drugs had not
been tested and labeled for use in human executions contrary to pro176
visions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The FDA declined to
act, arguing that it had discretion not to act unless there was “a seri177
ous danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud.”
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that there was
no law to apply in enforcement decisions, making them presumably
178
immune to judicial review under the APA.
Justice Rehnquist tied
civil enforcement discretion to criminal prosecutorial discretion. He
observed that it was well-established precedent that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
179
An agency deserves discretion and immunity from judiscretion.”
dicial review in part because decisions not to enforce often involve
180
balancing factors that are within the agency’s expertise. The agency is best placed to determine enforcement priorities, the likelihood
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (setting enforcement procedures such as making findings
on the record and providing for a hearing).
The language of the court suggests that this was dispositive of the case. Id.
Id. Thus, the case is consistent with Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (discussing the “no law
to apply” standard).
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653,
661 (1985); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985) (summarizing the facts).
Sunstein, supra note 175, at 661.
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824–25.
Id. at 837–38; see also Sunstein, supra note 175, at 662 (discussing the holding).
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.
Id.
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of enforcement success, how the enforcement action fits within the
agency’s policies, and whether the agency has the resources to en181
force in the first place. Justice Rehnquist recognized that an agency’s refusal to enforce shares many of the characteristics of a prosecu182
tor’s decision not to indict.
Just as past courts premised
prosecutorial discretion on the Take Care Clause, Justice Rehnquist
linked civil enforcement discretion to the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws establishing a constitutional basis for nonen183
forcement.
The Court in Chaney affirmed earlier cases that there was a distinc184
tion between discretionary acts and mandatory duties. Like Marbury
and Kendall, the Chaney Court found a dividing line between statutes
which imposed a mandatory duty on the Executive and statutes that
185
left discretion to the Executive. Since there is no law to apply in the
186
latter, only the former can be reviewed by the courts. In the most
recent nonenforcement case to reach a circuit court, the D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed the discretionary-mandatory distinction established by the
187
Supreme Court.
The court observed that the President can only
188
use prosecutorial discretion in enforcement actions. Prosecutorial
discretion cannot be used to ignore a statutory obligation or mandate
such as a requirement to issue rules, pay benefits, or administer statu189
tory programs.
After Chaney, the courts have given the President
significant deference over discretionary actions such as enforcement,
190
so long as Congress does not establish any mandatory duties.
181
182
183

184
185
186
187

188

189

190

Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. Justice Rehnquist found constitutional support for enforcement discretion in the
Take Care Clause, but the holding in Chaney was also premised on the APA’s § 701 since
enforcement decisions were actions committed to agency discretion unless otherwise indicated by Congress. Id. at 838.
Id. at 837.
See supra pp. 1524–26.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The case considered whether the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) could refuse to comply with the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act requiring the NRC to consider the Department of Energy’s license to store nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. Id. at 384.
Id. Judge Kavanaugh heavily relied upon the Pardon Power to defend prosecutorial discretion rather than a pure Take Care Clause analysis. See id. at 263–64 (discussing how
the Pardon Power allows the President to moderate the law and under-enforce a statute
to protect individual liberty).
See id. at 266 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion encompasses the discretion not to enforce a law
against private parties; it does not encompass the discretion not to follow a law imposing a
mandate or prohibition on the Executive Branch.”).
See Biber, supra note 169, at 485, n.89 (noting that Chaney has been cited hundreds of
times by federal appellate courts).

May 2016]

PRESIDENTIAL INACTION

1533

C. Limits to Nonenforcement Discretion
Chaney established a broad basis for nonenforcement discretion so
long as there is no law to apply; however, it also set certain limits that
differentiate it from the near absolute discretion held by the Executive in the criminal context. The discretion held by the Executive in
the civil context is rebuttable under two circumstances: (1) Congress
has limited the Executive’s discretion by setting substantive priorities
or circumscribing how an agency can discriminate among issues or
cases; or (2) the Executive has adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to “amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibili191
ties.”
Congress can restrict executive nonenforcement discretion
192
The
through statutory guidelines that the President must follow.
President cannot freely “disregard legislative direction in the statuto193
ry scheme that the agency administers.”
Statutory deadlines that
compel the Executive to act by a certain date are the simplest exam194
ples of statutory guidelines.
Other guidelines include substantive
195
priorities such as factors that the Executive must consider. Statutory guidelines rebut the presumption that there is no law to apply, but
Chaney recognized that it is difficult to determine exactly when Con196
gress has left an issue to agency discretion. Thus, nonenforcement
discretion analysis becomes a task of statutory interpretation to determine if the statute is clear in mandating action or otherwise cir197
cumscribing how the Executive can employ its discretion.

191

192
193
194

195

196
197

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 & n.4. There appears to be overlap between the two circumstances since a case involving the Executive disregarding statutory guidelines would amount to
an abdication.
Subject to limitations that will be discussed in Part IV.
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833; see Sunstein, supra note 175, at 670 (finding that the Take Care
Clause does not allow the President to decline enforcement of laws that he does not like).
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions,
103 GEO. L.J. 157, 177 (2014). For example, “The Secretary shall enforce violations of
the provisions in this statute beginning January 1, 2016.”
Chaney, 470 at 833; see also Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162–63 (holding that the plain language of
the statute clearly created an affirmative enforcement duty that could not be ignored by
the agency). For example, “The Secretary shall consider X and Y in enforcing violations
of the provisions in this statute.”
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 (“How to determine when Congress has done so is the question
left open by Overton Park.”).
As will be explored in Part IV, even statutory guidance or other mandatory commands
can be subject to discretion in certain circumstances. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra
note 194, at 177–78 (noting that resource scarcity may prevent an agency acting as Congress directed).
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Under a second limitation imposed by Chaney, the Executive cannot adopt a general policy of nonenforcement that “is so extreme as
198
The
to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”
Court did not elaborate other than to cite Adams v. Richardson for the
proposition that the Executive cannot ignore a statute that establishes
199
a clear mandatory or ministerial duty. Below this extreme position,
the lower courts and scholars have struggled to determine the scope
200
of an “abdication.” Zachary Price argues that only case-by-case determinations are permitted since categorical, policy-based nonen201
forcement decisions amount to an abdication. Lower courts agree
that Chaney shields single-shot or case-by-case enforcement decisions
202
An enforcement action that falls between a policy of
from review.
ignoring a statutory mandate and a one-shot action presents a much
more difficult case yet remains constitutional despite the argument
203
presented by Price.
Categorical nonenforcement decisions will be upheld where the
nonenforcement decision is for a limited duration or where the policy does not eliminate case-by-case discretion. The Eighth Circuit in
Kenney v. Glickman interpreted Chaney to foreclose an agency from es204
tablishing a permanent enforcement standard or policy.
The D.C.
Circuit in Schering Corp. v. Heckler found that a delay of enforcement
205
activities “falls squarely within the confines of Chaney.”
The FDA
decided to delay enforcement against a pharmaceutical company for
eighteen months pending review of whether the company’s drug was
206
subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. While Schering Corp. was a one-shot nonenforcement decision, Sunstein and
198
199

200
201
202

203

204
205
206

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.
The Court in Chaney declined to determine whether judicial review would be available
even in a situation similar to Adams, except noting that a statutory mandate or other enforcement guidelines would suggest that the action was not committed to agency discretion. Id.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 185.
See Price, supra note 26, at 675 (discussing categorical nonenforcement in the context of
congressional primacy).
See Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.2d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (“This language suggests that
Chaney applies to individual, case-by-case determinations of when to enforce existing regulations rather than permanent policies or standards.”); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc.
v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no basis for judicial review of singleshot nonenforcement decisions).
Recently, in dicta, the D.C. Circuit found a broad basis for the President to exercise enforcement discretion including categorical or policy-based nonenforcement. In re Aiken
Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Kenney, 96 F.3d at 1123.
779 F.2d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id.
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Vermeule found that the case law suggests that a temporary moratorium from enforcing discretionary duties would not amount to an
207
abdication.
The D.C. Circuit has found that nonenforcement policies that did
not restrain individual discretion would not constitute an abdication
of a statutory responsibility. In Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the court held that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s opinion about nonenforcement of
certain quality assurance regulations did not require mandatory
208
compliance; therefore, it did not amount to an abdication.
The
problem with general policies of nonenforcement is that they often
209
Courts,
look like legislative rulemaking in violation of the APA.
however, have found that non-binding agency general statements of
210
policy do not amount to legislative rules. Thus, the Executive can
take a categorical approach to nonenforcement so long as it does not
remove the possibility of case-by-case discretion. In defending the legality of the November 2014 immigration decisions, the Office of Legal Counsel argued that general policies of nonenforcement that
“merely provide a framework for making individualized, discretionary
assessments about whether to initiate enforcement actions in particular cases” would not be an abdication of an agency’s statutory respon211
sibilities.
A policy of nonenforcement is consistent with Chaney so
long as it does not create a binding duty on agency officers executing
the law by removing their individual enforcement discretion.
D. Summarizing Nonenforcement Discretion after Chaney
Chaney firmly established that nonenforcement discretion of civil
statutes is a valid exercise of executive power akin to prosecutorial
207
208
209

210

211

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 193.
Safe Energy Coal. of Mich. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1473, 1477
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
See Crowley Caribbean Transp. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that
general statements are more likely to include interpretations of statutes rather than a factual assessment that is associated with one-shot enforcement actions); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 171 (1996) (discussing the connection
between non-enforcement policies and enforcement guidelines that the agency treats as
“binding” in the context of rulemaking subject to § 553 of the APA).
See U.S. Tel. Ass’n. v. FCC, 28 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the action
was not a general statement of policy because it created a binding framework of penalties); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding that
the FDA’s policy had binding effect making it a legislative rule requiring § 553 noticeand-comment procedures).
The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (2014).
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discretion. The Court found authority for enforcement discretion
partially in the Take Care Clause, insulating nonenforcement deci212
The President has broad nonenforcesions from judicial review.
ment discretion as long as there is no law to apply unless Congress
has established clear statutory enforcement guidelines. However, the
restrictions on the discretion identified by Chaney are weaker than
they may seem on paper. As will be explored in the next part, a President can ignore mandatory duties created by Congress when the duty is unconstitutional or when Congress has failed to allocate resources.
Finally, the “abdication of a statutory responsibility”
standard has only been used to invalidate executive discretion when
the Executive ignored clear, mandatory statutory language as in Ad213
ams.
Anything less, including temporary enforcement delays or
non-binding general policies, is a valid exercise of nonenforcement
discretion.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO ENFORCING MANDATORY DUTIES:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES AND RESOURCE SCARCITY
Even mandatory statutory duties do not need to be enforced in
every instance. As established in the previous part, Congress can essentially convert a discretionary duty into a mandatory duty by including enforcement guidelines. Mandatory duties must be met by the
214
Executive, as held in Marbury and Kendall.
However, Presidents,
courts, and scholars have long recognized that mandatory duties can
215
be defeasible. Most recently in In re Aiken County, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that the President can decline to follow a statutory man-

212

213

214
215

The Court connected enforcement discretion to the Take Care Clause:
[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characters
of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision
which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). However,
the Court grounded much of its reasoning in the APA. Id. at 837.
See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the
EPA interpreted the law to change the substantive requirements of the law); Nat’l. Wildlife Fed. V. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773–74 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that there was law to
apply precluding agency discretion).
See supra text accompanying notes 115 and 129.
See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 835 (recognizing that the President can decline to
enforce a law in a number of circumstances).
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date if the statute is unconstitutional or Congress has failed to allo216
cate funds.
A. Unconstitutional Statutes
The President can decline to enforce a statute imposing a manda217
tory or ministerial duty that he believes to be unconstitutional. The
Take Care Clause creates a duty to enforce the laws, which includes
218
the Constitution. Since the President is charged with enforcing the
law and the Constitution is superior to laws passed by Congress, the
219
Delahunty
President must favor the Constitution over the statute.
and Yoo argue that an unconstitutional act of Congress is void and
cannot be law; thus, the President is under no obligation to enforce
220
the act of Congress.
The authority to disregard unconstitutional
221
statutes also derives from the presidential oath. The oath prohibits
the President from enforcing an unconstitutional statute since he
222
would be a participant in violating the Constitution. President Jefferson refused to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts because he believed that the Acts were unconstitutional and infringed on individual
223
rights. Taking a more limited perspective, some scholars have pro216

217

218

219
220
221

222
223

In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note
2, at 836, 845 (finding no executive nonenforcement power but conceding that the Executive can decline to enforce a statute if it is unconstitutional or Congress has failed to
provide sufficient resources).
See YOO, supra note 31, at 45–46 (arguing that the refusal to enforce an unconstitutional
statute derives from the President’s control over law enforcement); Robert J. Delahunty,
The Obama Administration’s Decisions to Enforce, But Not Defend, DOMA § 3, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 69, 71 (2011) (finding that the President has a constitutional basis to decline enforcement of unconstitutional statutes); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1617 (2008) (arguing that
the President has a duty to disregard unconstitutional statutes); Michael Sant’Ambrogio,
The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 411 (2014) (declining to enforce an unconstitutional law is an important feature of the Madisonian system of checks and balances).
Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 217, at 1627
(“Per the Faithful Execution Clause, which requires him to ‘take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,’ the President has a duty to enforce federal law, including the Constitution.”). See also In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 261 (noting that the Take Care Clause’s
reference to “Laws” includes the Constitution, which is superior to a statute).
Id.
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 836.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”).
Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 217, at 1629.
President Jefferson even believed that a court decision finding a statute to be constitutional did not constrain his discretion in enforcing the statute if he believed the statute
was unconstitutional. YOO, supra note 31, at 106–07. But see In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at
259 (finding that the President can decline to enforce a mandatory duty on constitutional
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posed a structural argument that the President has the authority to
refuse enforcement of a statute that infringes on his own powers pre224
Calabresi and Prakash argue that rescribed by the Constitution.
quiring the President to enforce unconstitutional statutes would undermine the separation of powers envisioned by the Framers during
225
the Constitutional Convention.
The President can (and scholars
such as Prakash argue “must”) decline enforcement of unconstitutional statutes even when they impose mandatory or ministerial duties
226
in order to uphold the Constitution.
B. Resource Scarcity
The President may insert discretion into a mandatory statutory
scheme when Congress fails to allocate sufficient funds. The President cannot perform the impossible, and if Congress has failed to
make the necessary appropriations then the President is excused
227
from fully executing the letter of the law. Without adequate funding, the law becomes at odds with itself, since the Executive cannot
228
do what Congress directed. In such cases, Sunstein and Vermeule
229
argue, the courts “must recognize a degree of flexibility.” However,
the Executive cannot completely ignore a statutory mandate only be230
cause Congress failed to appropriate the necessary funds.
In the
absence of full funding, the Executive is still required to effectuate
231
the statutory scheme within the funding constraints. In In re Aiken
County, the D.C. Circuit found that the NRC had to complete the licensing process for the Yucca Mountain project, a ministerial duty,

224
225
226

227
228
229
230
231

grounds as long as a final order by the court has not rejected the claim of unconstitutionality).
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 621–22 (arguing that the President has the
means to refuse enforcement of laws that usurp his constitutional powers).
Id. at 621–24; see also supra text accompanying note 95 (discussing how Wilson did not
want the Executive to become a “mere creature” of the legislature).
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 621; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 836
(arguing that the President has a duty to enforce the Constitution, which is a more important duty than enforcing an (unconstitutional) statute).
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 845.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 177–79.
Id. at 178.
In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 180 (noting that given a conflict between resource constraints
and a statutory deadline, the deadline has priority and the agency should try its best to effectuate the statute). But see In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 270 (Garland, C.J., dissenting)
(finding that partial application of the statute, given the resource constraints, would lead
to bad policy).
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even in the absence of full funding from Congress. The NRC could
only stop the licensing process if there were no appropriated funds
233
remaining. In the mandatory statutory duty context, resource constraints is a limited exception to the general rule that the President
must enforce the law. The President may exercise discretion, but he
must apply the law to the full extent allowable by funding.
V. APPLYING THE EXECUTIVE NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
FRAMEWORK TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS
The President has broad nonenforcement discretion as long as
Congress has not established any mandatory guidelines to restrict his
discretion. Whether the President’s use of nonenforcement discretion is constitutional is a two-step process. First, it must be determined whether the action in question is an enforcement action of the
type protected by Chaney and akin to prosecutorial discretion. Ministerial or other mandatory duties imposed by Congress are not insulated from judicial review by Chaney. Second, the inquiry must determine whether the statute includes any mandatory language or
statutory guidelines that would restrict or remove the President’s discretion. If the action is a discretionary enforcement action without
any law to apply, then the Executive is free to not enforce the law.
Under this analysis, the delay in enforcing the ACA employer mandate and the policy announced about immigration enforcement are
both valid exercises of executive nonenforcement discretion.
A. The ACA and the Employer Mandate
The delay of the ACA’s employer mandate is a valid exercise of
executive nonenforcement discretion and presents an easy case. The
employer mandate is a penalty placed on certain employers for fail234
ing to provide health insurance to their employees.
Enforcing a
penalty is an enforcement action. The statute contains no mandatory
language other than to define large employers as businesses that employ over fifty workers and provide how the penalty should be calcu235
lated.
Congress did not direct or constrain how the Executive
could enforce the penalty. The statute contains an effective date provision, but the provision merely says that employers would be subject

232
233
234
235

In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 267.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2015).
Id.
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to the penalty starting after December 31, 2013; it is not a mandatory
command to the Treasury Secretary to begin enforcement on that
236
date. As in Kenney v. Glickman, this is only a temporary delay rather
than a permanent decision not to enforce the law. The decision was
a delay in order to develop better enforcement procedures rather
237
than a permanent decision not to enforce the law. The delay of the
employer mandate is entirely within the President’s discretion, making it a valid exercise of executive nonenforcement discretion.
B. The Immigration Decisions
The immigration decisions present a more difficult case due to
the scope of the decisions and the complex nature of the underlying
immigration statutes. The President’s orders are enforcement actions since they involve decisions of enforcing the immigration statutes. Removal proceedings share more in common with a prosecutor’s decision to indict than the decision to delay the ACA employer
238
mandate. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States recognized
that executive officials have broad discretion over immigration en239
Federal officials have the discretion even to decide
forcement.
whether to pursue removal and to determine the relief that would al240
low undocumented aliens to remain in the country.
President
Obama’s immigration decisions comprise two distinct actions: (1)
prioritizing the removal of certain aliens over others; and (2) extending deferred action to certain aliens who are parents of legally present children.

236
237

238

239
240

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513(d), 124 St. 119,
256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at
8,545 (implementing the delay); see also Press Release, Department of the Treasury,
Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared Responsibility
Under the Affordable Care Act for 2015 (announcing the delay); Kenney v. Glickman, 96
F.2d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that permanent enforcement policies would
amount to abdications of statutory responsibilities under Chaney).
See The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. at 3 (2014) (detailing removal procedures and the role of the Secretary of DHS in
deciding whether to order removal).
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
Id.; see also 6 U.S.C. § 202 (“The Secretary . . . shall be responsible for . . . establishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”) (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(3) (“[The Secretary of DHS] shall establish such regulations . . . and perform
such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions
of this chapter.”).
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1. Removal Prioritization
As part of the immigration nonenforcement actions, DHS announced that it would focus its enforcement actions on high priority
241
individuals. The enforcement plan has three priorities. The highest priority are aliens who are threats to national security and criminals who committed felonies, followed by aliens who committed misdemeanors or entered the United States after January 1, 2014, and
finally, aliens who were issued a final order of removal after Decem242
ber 31, 2013. This prioritization is valid so long as it is not contrary
to any direction from Congress.
Unlike the ACA delay, Congress has established statutory guidelines and priorities that must be followed unless there is a constitu243
tional issue or resource constraint.
DHS contends that Congress
has only appropriated enough resources to remove fewer than
400,000 aliens each year out of a total population approximating 11.3
244
million undocumented aliens.
It can under-enforce the statutory
guidelines and insert its discretion so long as it uses available resources to effectuate the statutory scheme as fully as possible. DHS’s
prioritization roughly matches the statutory guidelines set in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a). Under the statute, inadmissible aliens include individuals
245
who are convicted criminals, who pose a threat to national security
246
247
or public health, who are likely to become public charges, or who
248
Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 sets classes of deare illegally present.
portable aliens who can be removed at the discretion of the Secretary
249
of DHS.
DHS’s prioritization, while not as encompassing as the
statute, mirrors the congressional guidelines by focusing on criminals
250
In Texas v.
and individuals who pose threats to national security.
241

242
243
244

245
246
247
248
249
250

Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske,
Leon Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal
of Undocumented Immigrants at 3–4.
Id.
See generally Margulies, supra note 169 (discussing immigration law and nonenforcement).
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. at 9 (2014).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
8 U.S.C. § 1227. The classes mirror the categories listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (e.g., criminals, threats to national security, etc.).
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske,
Leon Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal
of Undocumented Immigrants at 3.

1542

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:5

United States, the district court agreed with DHS, finding that determinations of how to prioritize limited resources were entirely within
251
the Executive’s discretion. The removal prioritization decision is a
valid exercise of nonenforcement discretion given limited resources,
and it is consistent with the statutory guidelines.
2. Deferred Action
Deferred action is the second component of President Obama’s
immigration decisions and is the primary subject of the legal challenge against DHS in Texas v. United States. Deferred action is a form
of administrative relief that allows DHS to defer the removal of an il252
legal alien for a period of time.
Versions of deferred action have
existed since at least the 1960s to ameliorate harsh and unjust out253
comes. The November 2014 deferred action program expanded
coverage of the 2012 DACA program for DREAMers and applied deferred action to individuals who have children in the United States
who are citizens or lawful permanent residents, subject to certain
254
conditions.
Deferred action is a proper exercise of executive nonenforcement
discretion. First, the policy is consistent with the statutory guidelines
since an individual is only eligible for deferred action if they have a
child who is a citizen or permanent resident, have continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 2010, and are not an en255
forcement priority.
The conditions in the 2014 deferred action
program mirror the statutory scheme set by Congress in 8 U.S.C. §
256
1229b(b)(1).

251
252

253
254

255
256

86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R.
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 2.
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R.
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 4. The conditions require that the
individual has continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 2010, was physically present in the United States when the memorandum was issued (November 20,
2014), and is not a removal priority. Id.
Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit held, perhaps correctly, that the policy’s continuous presence requirement is in conflict with the statutory guidance in 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires continuous presence for ten years; thus, DHS exceeded
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Second, the deferred action program is not an abdication of statutory responsibilities. The nonenforcement policy outlined in a memorandum from Secretary Jeh Johnson requires deferred action to be
used on a case-by-case basis; thus, it is not binding and an abdica257
tion. As held in Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a nonenforcement policy is valid so long as
it does not require mandatory compliance or restrict case-by-case dis258
cretion. In the immigration context, “real or perceived inadequate
enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a reviewable
259
abdication of duty.”
By requiring case-by-case determinations, the
2014 deferred action program is more akin to a general statement of
policy rather than a legislative rule since it does not mandate a find260
ing of eligibility in every instance; therefore, it is not an abdication
despite being a categorical nonenforcement policy.
The State plaintiffs challenging DHS argued, and the Fifth Circuit
agreed, that the 2014 deferred action program was not an exercise of
261
nonenforcement discretion but an affirmative agency action.
Affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that deferred action
would affirmatively confer “lawful presence” status and associated
benefits such as the ability to obtain Social Security numbers, work
authorization permits, unemployment insurance, and driver’s licens262
es. Reminiscent of Adams v. Richardson, the Fifth Circuit held that
by conferring eligibility for benefits the agency exercised its power
such that it “can be reviewed to determine whether the agency ex-

257

258
259

260

261
262

the statutory guidance. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 180, cert. granted, 2016 WL
207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674).
Memorandum from Jeh Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 3–4.
866 F.2d 1473, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 834 (1985) (“The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the
most appropriate body to policy this aspect of their performance.”).
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R.
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 2–4. Judge King agreed with the
DHS that the DAPA Memorandum still requires “discretionary judgments as to the application of the respective criteria to the facts of a particular case.” Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d at 204 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting).
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 at 169.
Id. at 166. In dissent, Judge King disagreed saying that “lawful presence” does not confer
“legal status” and it is not a change in designation. Id. at 199 (King, J., dissenting).
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263

ceeded its statutory powers.”
In Adams, the federal government
provided funds to civil rights violators despite a statute prohibiting
264
The 2014 deferred action program is distinguishable
such action.
from Adams because granting deferred action does not directly convey any benefits or flout any statutes. The Fifth Circuit erred by conflating two separate actions. In the first action, DHS determines
whether an individual is eligible for deferred action. Once an individual is granted deferred action, DHS can make a second decision to
265
grant employment benefits pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).
The benefits are incidental to deferred action and are authorized
from specific provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Judge King made this exact point in her dissent in Texas v. United
States. The Immigration and Nationality Act and its associated regula266
tions grant the benefits, not the DAPA Memorandum. In effect, the
majority’s interpretation would make any use of nonenforcement discretion subject to review if it triggered incidental benefits, which
267
would swallow the Chaney doctrine. Deferred action does not grant
any benefits—it just provides temporary relief from removal, making
268
it the type of nonenforcement action encompassed by Chaney.
CONCLUSION
Executive nonenforcement discretion is well-founded in case law,
history, and text, but it remains controversial because it can encompass sweeping executive power through selectivity in enforcement ac263
264
265

266
267
268

Id. at 168.
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
“As used in this section, the term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by
this chapter or by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)(2015). Prior to the enactment of this section in 1986, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) promulgated regulations allowing the Attorney General (now DHS) to grant employment authorization to individuals granted deferred action. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). By
enacting § 1324a(h)(3) and the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) in 1986, Congress did not remove the Attorney General Authority. The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. at 21, n.11
(2014). Thus, there is a grant of authority to the Executive in the INA allowing for deferred action recipients to receive employment authorization.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 at 198 (King, J., dissenting)
Id. at 201 (King, J., dissenting).
If the State plaintiffs want to challenge the grant of benefits to illegal aliens then they
should challenge § 274A(h)(3) of the INA and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) as impermissible grants of legislative authority rather than challenge the Executive’s discretion to cancel removal under deferred action.
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tions. Prior to President Obama, nonenforcement discretion did not
receive front-page attention on The New York Times in part because
past decisions often involved non-politicized issues such as food and
drug safety or nuclear regulation. President George W. Bush’s use of
nonenforcement discretion over environmental laws raised concerns
among environmentalists but did not necessarily garner prominent
269
national attention. President Obama’s decisions have been particularly controversial because they addressed the most maligned accomplishment of his presidency (health care) and one of the biggest political issues in current American politics (immigration).
Furthermore, even DHS and the Office of Legal Counsel recognized
that the immigration decisions were likely the broadest use of execu270
tive nonenforcement discretion by a President.
Contrary to the arguments put forth by Price, the size of the nonenforcement decision is not determinative. The key question is
whether the President has discretionary authority to enforce the law
rather than mandatory requirements imposed by Congress. This
grants the President considerable discretion, but the text of the Constitution and the understanding of the Framers supports this interpretation. The Framers did not intend to create an executive unable
to resist and act independently of the legislature. Furthermore, early
practice by Presidents Washington and Jefferson supported robust
presidential authority and influence over law enforcement.
Such considerable presidential discretion is potentially troubling
especially since the courts are unwilling to review nonenforcement
discretion after Chaney, recognizing that such authority is an executive prerogative. It is easy to see how a President could abuse his enforcement discretion to under-enforce important environmental or
271
public health laws.
However, the President’s actions are constitutional as long as he avoids contradicting a statutory mandate. If the
President is acting within his discretion, the issue is a political dispute
between the executive and legislative branches. The Court in Chaney
272
explicitly left such disputes for Congress to resolve. Madison envi269
270

271
272

Deacon, supra note 6, at 807–16 (reviewing examples of nonenforcement by President
George W. Bush).
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op.
O.L.C. at 30 (2014).
See Deacon, supra note 8, at 796 (arguing that nonenforcement discretion has been used
as a deregulation tool).
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (“[W]e essentially leave to Congress, and
not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings
should be judicially reviewable.”).
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sioned a system of checks and balances. President Obama has resorted to nonenforcement discretion precisely because Congress has
been unable to pass legislation and unwilling to check the concentra273
tion of power in the Executive. Executive nonenforcement discretion is constitutional. If Congress is concerned about executive discretion, then it should follow the instruction of Chaney and enact
legislation rather than continuing the practice of abdicating power to
the executive branch.

273

See Deacon, supra note 8, at 805 (noting the political obstacles that make nonenforcement appealing). The 112th and 113th Congresses have been the least productive in terms of legislative productivity in history. Drew DeSilver, In Late Spurt of Activity,
Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congressavoids-least-productive-title/. The 113th Congress only enacted 296 laws compared to
over 700 during the 1970s. Bills by Final Status: Statistics and Historical Comparison,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).

